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Barter and the Origin of Money and Some Insights from the 
Ancient Palatial Economies of Mesopotamia and Egypt 
 
ABSTRACT 
The "Metallist" origin of money, used as a medium of exchange, is based on the presumed 
low efficiency of barter. However, barter is usually ill-defined and archaeological evidence 
about it is inconclusive. Moreover, the transaction costs associated with barter seem to have 
been exaggerated by metallists. Indeed, the introduction of a unit of account reduces the 
complexity of the relative prices system usually associated with barter. Similarly, in-kind 
transactions have timing constraints which are often labeled as "the double coincidence of 
wants"; with a system of debt and credit, delayed exchange, that is lending, is possible. Such 
adaptability of barter is confirmed by the study of Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian 
palatial economies. They provide evidence that non-monetary transactions have persisted 
during millennia, challenging the metallist vision about the origin of money. 
 
Keywords: Money, Unit of Account, Medium of exchange, Barter, Palatial economies, 
Transaction costs, Mesopotamia, Sumerian city-states, Ancient Egypt, Phoenician city-states. 
JEL Codes: B11, O1, Z13 
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Barter and the Origin of Money and Some Insights from the 
Ancient Palatial Economies of Mesopotamia and Egypt 
1.  Introduction 
Money is a fascinating object which, apart from economists, has attracted the attention of 
other social scientists, especially philosophers, historians and archaeologists. For the latter, 
the introduction of money in past societies represents one of their major socio-economic 
changes - as does the introduction of agriculture or metalworking. This should, therefore, lead 
them to analyze it by means of the usual set of queries, when and where, why and how? 
However, this is not the case, i.e. this set, or package, of usual queries is not well-tailored for 
the study of the origin of money.  
It is widely agreed by scholars that, for southwestern Asia, coinage was introduced for the 
first time in Lydia
1
 around the seventh century B.C.E.. Such evidence seems to provide a 
convincing answer to the when and where queries. However, it does not explain why it was 
introduced. Before coinage, other forms of money existed. Indeed, coining was designed to 
facilitate the free transferability of metallic money by providing a guarantee of the fineness 
and weight of metal uses as money. Pre-coinage currencies were not restricted to pieces of 
metal, i.e. various commodities, such as salt, cattle, barley (...) could also be considered as 
primitive monies (Einzig, 1966; Geva, 1987; Grierson, 1977; Powell, 1996; Quiggin, 1949). 
The problem with all these primitive monies (including metal ingots) is that there were used 
for two different purposes, as a means of exchange, and as commodities; therefore, it is very 
difficult – almost impossible – for archaeologists to identify primitive money from artefacts 
provided by archaeological excavations. For instance, a retrieved silver ingot could have been 
kept either for casting jewelry or to be used as a medium of future transactions. Thus, before 
the introduction of coinage is considered, the when and where queries about the origin of 
money remain unanswered. This is because unlike agriculture or metalworking, which are 
both from a mixed-product of nature and culture, money is a purely cultural invention, an 
"idea". Therefore, since the functions of money evolved and because much of this evolution 
                                                          
1
 There is evidence that coinage did not originate in Lydia but was imported from elsewhere; however, because 
Lydian coinage was the first to spread and to gain universal expansion, Lydia can be regarded as the first 
effective source of coinage (Geva, 1987, p. 130). 
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was not as a result of conscious thought, it is vain to try to find out when and where this idea 
emerged. 
Given this previous restriction on the determination of the origin of money, scholars have 
focused their attention on the two remaining queries: why money has been introduced in past 
societies, and how such an introduction unfolded? Starting in the Classical period in ancient 
Greece, attempts to answer these questions have led to controversies among famous 
philosophers which are still alive today. On the one hand, Plato (1992) suggested that 
currency should be regarded as an arbitrary "symbol"
2
 to help exchanges. He was against 
using precious metals (such as gold and silver) because, in his opinion, the value of currency 
should be independent from the material from which money is made. On the other hand, for 
Aristotle (1984) currency was a third merchandise with intrinsic value rather than an abstract 
monetary sign. For him, the inconvenience of barter led people in ancient societies to choose 
metals as a means of exchange, because of their physical features.  
This Aristotelian or "metallist" vision of currency has been dominant over the Platonic vision 
until nowadays. Indeed, and as shown in economic textbooks, the origin of money is usually 
presented according to the metallist vision by "orthodox" or mainstream economists, i.e. 
economists who firmly believe in the virtues of the market-economy (Clower, 1969; Jevons, 
1875; Menger, 1892; North, 1984; Samuelson, 1967; Smith, 1776). For these economists, 
money, as a medium of exchange - and implicitly also as a unit of account - has been 
introduced in the economy owing to the lower efficiency of the barter system. Barter - pure 
and simple - or cashless exchange, is defined as the direct exchange of commodities (or 
services) between agents, without any intermediate object in the transaction (Chapman, 1980, 
p. 35). The presumed inefficiency of barter stems from two main transaction costs associated 
with it. On the one hand, unlike monetary transactions in which money is automatically a unit 
of account, barter does not imply the introduction of a standard of value. Then as the number 
of tradeable goods present in the economy increases, the number of relative prices is growing 
exponentially. On the other hand, since there is no medium of exchange, the transactions 
necessitate the double coincidence of wants. Even in an economy with a large number of 
goods and agents, such double coincidence of wants can hardly happen without incurring 
important searching costs. 
                                                          
2
 Some contemporary authors agree with Plato's vision even though they used different expressions such as 
"Money as a metaphor" (Cribb, 2005) and "Money is a creature of law" (Knapp, 1924). 
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From the mid-eighteen century onward, orthodox economists have supported the metallist 
vision of the origin of money, because it matches with the economic system they were 
describing and promoting, namely capitalism. Indeed, money fosters market transactions and 
the division of labor as well as it promotes economic prosperity. Even though capitalism has 
been the dominant mode of production only for the last few centuries, scholars are divided 
about how economies operated in past societies (Davies, 2005). On the one hand, there are the 
"modernizers" and the "formalists" who share the view of orthodox economists that ancient 
economies were similar in kind to modern ones and only different in degree, i.e. they were 
driven by the rational behavior of self-interested optimizing individuals. On the other hand, 
there are the "primitivists" and the "substantivists" (Polanyi, 1944) who consider that ancient 
economies were socially embedded or mainly driven by institutions and social obligations, i.e. 
that the role of individuals as well as markets were secondary. This controversial issue about 
ancient economies raises doubt about the relevance of the metallist vision for explaining the 
origin of money in past societies. This doubt becomes even more important when evidence 
about the existence of barter and pre-coinage currencies in past societies are considered. 
Indeed, this evidence is either lacking or ambiguous, i.e. can be interpreted according to 
different and even from opposite points of view. If the analysis of the evidence about barter 
and money is inconclusive, it is also because barter and the use of coins are not discrete cases- 
even if the reverse is often thought to be so. Indeed, they are both located at the extremes of a 
continuous spectrum which includes several intermediate cases such as different media of 
exchange and primitive monies.  
As pointed out by Schumpeter (1972, p. 63), "whatever may be its shortcomings, this theory 
[Aristotle's], though never unchallenged, prevailed substantially to the end of the nineteenth 
century and even beyond. It is the basis of the bulk of all analytic work in the field of money". 
Recently this theory has been challenged on the grounds that it is historically inaccurate. 
Indeed, recent anthropological studies question the idea that early societies went from a barter 
economy to money and instead contend that money arose to keep track of pre-existing credit 
relationships (Douglas, 2016; Graeber, 2011; Martin, 2013). It is therefore our purpose to 
provide some insights about its relevance for explaining the origin of money in ancient 
palatial economies. To do this, we assess the extent to which market exchanges are hindered 
by the presumed transactions costs associated with barter. Then we examine how ancient Near 
Eastern societies – Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian – managed to rely on barter for 
exchange, despite their growing economies. The available evidence provides some support to 
5 
 
Plato's explanation of the origin of currency, and therefore confirms our doubt about the 
relevance of the metallist vision. 
2.  The Origin of Money: Metallism vs.Chartalism 
As stated previously the origin of money has led to a controversy at least from the Classical 
period in Greece. This controversy was also present among economists, and is still present 
today.  
According to the epoch considered, the Aristotelian vision of currency is often labeled 
"Metallism". Metallists believe that money developed spontaneously as a medium of 
exchange in order to eliminate the obvious limitations of barter. In other words, the origins 
and the early evolution of money are viewed as an unintended consequence of spontaneous 
individual actions in the context of barter. Thus, money emerged via a natural process of 
transaction cost minimization. Metallism was an economic principle stating that the value of 
money derived from the purchasing power of the commodity upon which it is based. It has 
deeply influenced monetary policies during the most recent centuries, at least until the end of 
the Bretton Woods system in the late 1970s, even though the latter issue is still controversial. 
Nowadays, economists have kept the label "Metallism" even though they are perfectly aware 
that the value of money has nothing to do with metals. As pointed out by Ingham (2004), even 
though it is no longer argued that money needs to consist of a material with an intrinsic 
exchange-value, it is still conceptualized as a commodity since it is understood, as any other 
commodity, by means of an orthodox methodology in micro-economics. 
On the other hand, there is the Platonic vision of currency, also called the credit theory of 
money (de Bruin et al., 2018). This contends that money is a social construction rather than a 
physical commodity. The abstract entity in question is a credit relationship; that is, a promise 
from someone to repay a favor (product or service) to the holder of the token. In order to 
function, two further features are crucial. First, the promise must be sufficiently credible, that 
is, the issuer is “creditworthy”. Second, the credit must be transferable, that is, others will also 
accept it as payment for trade. This Platonic vision of currency led to "Chartalism", a term
3
 
coined by Knapp (1924). Indeed it is commonly thought that the most creditworthy issuer of 
money is the State. Thus, Chartalism, also called "Modern Monetary Theory" in its most 
recent form, is a theory which argues that money originated with states' attempts to direct 
                                                          
3
 The name derives from the Latin charta, in the sense of a token or ticket. 
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economic activity rather than as a spontaneous solution to the problems with barter. It states 
that fiat currency has value in exchange because of sovereign power to levy taxes on 
economic activity payable in the currency they issue. Such claim is even grounded on some 
historical cases, such as for archaic Greece and ancient Mesopotamia (Semenova, 2011). Even 
though it has fewer proponents than Metallism, some famous economists have supported it to 
some extent (for example, Galbraith, 2010; Keynes, 1914, 1982; Minsky, 2008; Mitchell-
Innes, 1913). 
To some extent, the origin of the controversy between metallists and chartalists relies on 
different points of view about barter. The metallist view posits that individuals engaged in 
trucking and bartering developed money to minimize their transaction costs (North, 
1984)(North, 1984). Hence, the adoption of money as a medium of exchange is simply 
considered as a technical development. Orthodox economists have proposed various 
arguments to support this view. For instance, Samuelson (1967, p. 54) stated that "if we were 
to reconstruct history along logical lines, [...then] we should naturally follow the age of 
barter by the age of commodity money." These authors have an evolutionist view of modes of 
exchange across the ages based on the following 'logical' sequence
4
: barter - barter plus 
primitive money - primitive money - primitive plus modern money - then modern money 
almost exclusively. Samuelson added (1967, p. 54) that "Even in the most advanced industrial 
countries (...) if we strip exchange down its barest essentials and peel off the obscuring layer 
of money, we find that trade between individuals or nations largely boils down to barter." In 
fact, the vision orthodox economists have about money is not grounded on any evidence 
(archeological or historical), but is provided by pure logical reconstruction of how they 
believe transactions were performed in the past. As highlighted by Humphrey (1985, p. 50-
51), a good illustration of this methodological approach is provided by Clower (1969). He 
imagined an island economy without money and assumed that people have a natural desire to 
trade goods. Given the transactions costs implied by barter, he deduced that people would first 
bartered at fairgrounds. In the subsequent stage of evolution, he logically deduced that some 
trading-posts would be established for particular goods. In the next stage, one of the most 
common item should be used as means of exchange at all the posts. At the final stage, this 
commodity should be used as money, i.e. as a means of payment, a store of value and a unit of 
account. This commodity is preferred to others because it can be used as a medium of 
                                                          
4
For the sake of simplicity we present this evolution in discrete stages. However, archaeological and historical 
evidence support the view that evolution has rather occurred along the lines suggested. 
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exchange owing to its intrinsic qualities: divisibility, storability, durability, transportability, 
uniformity. 
One may note that the process described in Clower's example is grounded on the rationality of 
agents, i.e. it seems to be the outcome of an intended process decided and organized by 
rational agents. We contend a different view, i.e. the introduction of money is rather the 
outcome of social selection of the fittest media of exchange for the purpose it serves in 
exchange. It is a process external to individuals per se and involves social selection from sets 
of new possibilities as they arise. Given the presence of embedding, the overall development 
is independent of individual rationalism. 
3.  Ancient Economies: Formalists vs. Substantivists 
In fact, the origin of the controversy between metallists and chartalists is deeper than a mere 
opposition of different views about barter or even money. Indeed, it is related to the 
tremendous controversy between formalists/modernizers and substantivists/primitivists who, 
when compared to modern ones, explain how ancient economies were operating (Davies, 
2005).  
Here again, the origin of this controversy can be understood by starting from the view 
metallists/orthodox economists have about barter. For them, the complexity of the relative 
price system and the double coincidence of wants are two main drawbacks demonstrating that 
economic transactions are hindered in a barter economy. Since Adam Smith seminal work 
(1776), it is well known that economic prosperity results from the division of labor, and that 
the latter necessitates that market transactions – especially between workers who have 
specialized tasks – should be facilitated. Money, as a medium of exchange is therefore an 
important pre-requisite (as well as property rights) for the development of market 
transactions. Without money, market exchanges are hindered as well as the division of labor, 
and therefore economic growth remains lower than what has been observed during the last 
centuries as a consequence of the spread of capitalism. Given this previous statement, it seems 
that from the mid-eighteen century, the way orthodox economists have explained the origin of 
money – assuming that barter inefficiency had led individuals to introduce money – had been 
chosen simply because it was consistent with their vision of the economy and the society. 
Indeed, by assuming that money had been introduced thanks to individuals initiatives, and that 
this had ultimately led to the development of the market-economy (and capitalism), they 
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highlighted the virtues of an egalitarian society based on individuals, i.e. a society in which 
State agency is lacking or merely useless. 
The preceding view – assuming that the introduction of money triggered the development of 
markets and finally of the whole economy – is shared by orthodox economists as well as by 
some other social scientists (especially anthropologists and historians) labeled as the 
"modernizers". Unlike their opponents, the "primitivists", they consider that ancient 
economies only differ in degree, not in kind, compared to modern economies. This dichotomy 
echoes another one between the "formalists" and the "substantivists". The former who mainly 
agree with the "modernizers", assume that economic behavior based on rational self-interested 
individuals and market exchanges were already the cornerstones of ancient economies. This 
orthodox/modernizers/formalists view is then at odds with the view contended by the 
primitivists/substantivists as well as by some economists labeled as "heterodox" (Keynes, 
1914, 1982; Marx, 1954; Mitchell-Innes, 1913; Schumpeter, 1972). According to the latter 
view, ancient economies were socially and politically embedded. In other words, individuals 
did not exist as relevant social entities since all their actions were constrained by various 
social obligations. This has led Polanyi (1944) to distinguish three modes of exchange, 
namely reciprocity, redistribution and market-exchange. While he agreed that these three 
modes of exchange co-existed at any epoch, he stressed that it was only during the last few 
centuries - and the spread of capitalism - that market-exchange had become the dominant one. 
Polanyi's term, "the great transformation," refers to the divide between modern, market-
dominated societies and non-western, non-capitalist pre-industrial societies. 
As explained above the academic literature is far from having any consensus among scholars 
concerning what were ancient economies. Thus, if we assume that ancient economies were 
closer to what Polanyi (1944; 1957) described, i.e. were socially embedded with very few 
market exchanges, then the question is whether the view of metallists/orthodox economists 
about the origin of money is consistent or not with such economies? 
4.  Archaeological and Ethnographical Evidence About Bartered or Monetary 
Transactions Are Inconclusive 
Even though all scholars agree that barter is universal (Chapman, 1980), i.e. can be, in theory, 
organized at any place and at any moment, empirical evidence about it is quite limited. 
Humphrey (1985) even claims that there is no evidence, historical or contemporary, of a 
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society in which barter is the main mode of exchange. Most, if not all, the evidence we have 
about barter comes from ethnographic studies of remote (and often shrinking) communities 
who - for various reasons - are living at the margins of our capitalist and monetary modern 
world. Then, it is quite sure that our knowledge of barter is biased, i.e. must be quite different 
from the system on which all human living on earth have organized their exchanges during 
millennia. In other words, our empirical knowledge of barter is biased and can hardly be used 
to infer how economic transactions were operated in ancient societies. 
As it is well known by biologists, many plants, insects or animals have a symbiotic 
relationships, i.e. they obtain mutual advantages from the direct exchange of resources or 
services. Since Homo sapiens is a 'social animal', it is not surprising to claim that barter – the 
direct exchange of resources or services between human – is as old as the recorded history of 
man (Davies, 2002). While it is certain that barter has existed during prehistory, it remains 
very difficult to identify it from the archaeological records. Several reasons explain why this 
is so. It is likely that many commodities used, even frequently, for bartering, have let no or 
very few archaeological record since they were perishable (e.g. furs, salt, cattle) or have been 
transformed in subsequent periods (e.g. due to metal recycling). Even for non-perishable 
goods (such as shells, stones), researchers face several methodological problems (Tykot, 
2004). Indeed, even though a durable good is found in large quantities at a given place where 
it can be considered as "exotic", it nevertheless remains difficult to identify all the different 
steps associated with its chaîne opératoire. These steps include the provenance of the object, 
its production, transportation, use and disposal. For some objects – see e.g. the obsidian 
(Tykot, 2004) – such traceability can be realized by using specific technologies (e.g. isotopic 
analysis); however, a fundamental mystery remains about the motivation underlying the flow 
of these goods (Oka and Kusimba, 2008). Was the presence of this type of good associated 
with a one-way flow or with a two-way flow? Was this flow motivated by reciprocity, 
redistribution or was is market-exchange? Moreover, different artefacts of the same item can 
be found at the same place but each of them could be there for different reasons. 
According to primitivists, societies from the remote past were characterized by fundamentally 
distinct modes of socio-economic integration which are not found in modern days. More 
specifically, it seems likely that both domestic and foreign trade were marginal, at least before 
the Bronze Age, even though we do not know precisely to what extent it was marginal. 
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In addition to these problems of evidence about barter, it is widely agreed by scholars that 
hunting and gathering societies were based on sharing (Benz, 2010), or the "rule of 
hospitality" (Henry, 2004). Indeed in most foraging societies, exchanges based on self-interest 
– and this includes barter – were inexistent and sometimes even forbidden. Except for 
personal belongings, such as clothes, there was no private property in such economies. It is 
likely that the same social rule was present in the small farming communities of the Early 
Neolithic, since they were also socially organized on kin, as pre-Neolithic foraging groups 
were. Hence, it is difficult (even impossible) to define accurately to what extent barter was 
present in foraging groups as well as in early farming hamlets and villages. In fact, accurate 
knowledge about barter in practice can only be obtained from the historical period, i.e. from 
the period in which writing exists. As explained below, the first evidence of writings (or pre-
writings) are found in Mesopotamia (especially in Sumerian city-states) and ancient Egypt 
around the end of the fourth millennium B.C.E.. 
If, as stated previously, it remains difficult – if not to say impossible – to find archaeological 
evidence of barter in prehistoric societies, the same can be said of money. With such claim we 
do not challenge the fact that money, used as a means of exchange, has been introduced in 
economies at some early stage of their evolution. On the contrary, we have numerous 
examples provided by ethnographic studies, realized on all continents, that various objects 
(e.g. shell, stone, metal ingots, salt, cattle...) have been used as primitive monies (Quiggin, 
1949). When compared to a more advanced money, primitive monies are "all money that is 
not coin or, like modern paper money, a derivative of coin" (Grierson, 1977, p. 14). More 
precisely, and as stated by Einzig (1966, p. 317), a primitive money is "A unit or object 
conforming to a reasonable degree to some standard of uniformity, which is employed for 
reckoning or for making a large proportion of the payments customary in the community 
concerned, and which is accepted in payment largely with the intention of employing it for 
making payments." However, the available ethnographic examples of primitive monies can 
hardly be used to determine what has precisely happened in ancient economies. Indeed, even 
though a particular object is found in large quantities in the archaeological excavations at a 
given location, several interpretations are possible: it could have been used as either only a 
commodity, or as a commodity and a means of exchange, or only as money. Even if we 
assume that a commodity was used exclusively as primitive money, we do not really know 
why and how it became part of the economy. In other words, were primitive monies 
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introduced because barter was inefficient, as claimed by orthodox economists, or was it for 
another reason? Or was it a result of a process of social selection? 
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5.  Barter: Its Motivations, Timing, and Finality. 
In addition to the reasons detailed in the previous section, archaeological evidences about the 
existence of barter or money are inconclusive also because both concepts do not have a 
unique and widely agreed definition. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
provide an analysis of the definition of money, a brief analysis of the definition of barter helps 
to illustrate such difficulties. 
According to the Cambridge dictionary of English, the verb "to barter" is defined as "to 
exchange goods for other things rather than for money".
5
Even though it is clear from this 
definition that under barter, goods (or services) are exchanged for other goods (or services), 
there are three additional dimensions which remain vague in this definition. 
The first is about the motivations of the agents leading to the exchange of goods. For some 
authors, such as Chapman (1980), barter should be restricted to pure economic transactions, 
i.e. only to market exchange. However, it is also possible to consider that exchanges 
motivated by social obligations or even coercion (e.g. by reciprocity or redistribution, 
according to Polanyi's terminology) are also barter if they are cashless. 
The second dimension is about the timing of the exchange. What is implicit in the above 
definition of barter, is that the terms of exchange of goods are settled at the same time. This 
does not exclude the possibility that the goods are delivered at different times. In such a case, 
we should talk about delayed barter. According to Graeber (2011), "gift economies" were 
common, at least at the beginnings of the first agrarian societies, when humans used elaborate 
credit systems. In other words, if we do not allow the existence of delayed barter -and 
therefore of the associated debt/credit system – then barter is a pure abstraction.  
The third dimension concerns the finality of the exchange, i.e. what the goods are used for 
once they have been exchanged. What is implicit with the above definition of barter, is that 
the exchanged goods are used as goods (consumed or invested), immediately or later. 
However, this may give rise to an intricate outcome. Let us consider the following example: 
one may assume that a good is exchanged today and that initially its buyer wanted to consume 
it later. Let us now assume that for some reasons, its owner decides in the future to use this 
good for (the payment of) another exchange. Then this good, which is not consumed, is used 
in the future as a medium of exchange. In other words, the way this good is used in the future 
                                                          
5
 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictionnaire/anglais/barter accessed on June 13, 2019. 
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implies that the initial transaction should not be considered as pure barter because the latter 
excludes the existence of any intermediate object. 
The latter situation is also useful in demonstrating that the boundaries between bartered and 
monetary transactions are blurred. Indeed, once a good is exchanged not for itself, i.e. not to 
be consumed, it becomes a medium of exchange. Once a good is exchanged mainly not to be 
consumed as a good but to be used as a medium of exchange, it becomes a primitive money.  
6.  The Complexity of the Relative Price System and the Unit of Account 
The first presumed drawback associated with barter is the complexity of the relative price 
system. From a theoretical point of view, such complexity can be illustrated as follows. 
Let us assume a given economy in which Nn
*

  goods (and/or services) exist and can be 
exchanged. In a monetary economy, money is used as a medium of exchange and is also, 
implicitly, a standard of value. So, once one of these n goods is considered as money, the 
value of the (n-1) remaining goods can be expressed with respect to it. In other words, the 
number of relative prices in this economy is equal to (n-1). 
In a pure barter economy, the value of any good must be expressed with respect to all the (n-
1) remaining goods. Thus, the total number of relative prices is equal to (n-1).(n/2), given 
that, obviously, the relative price of a good with respect to itself is equal to 1. 
While the total number of relative prices is proportional to the number of goods when money 
is introduced, it increases exponentially in the barter-economy. Then, in such a theoretical 
framework, the relative price system associated with barter is very difficult to handle. 
However, one may wonder whether such limit associated in theory with barter also exists in 
practice? Two cases deserve special attention. 
The first one is deduced from what happens in a monetary economy, as we have described 
previously. In such economy, the complexity of the price system has been reduced by 
introducing money, given the fact that one of the three functions of money is to be a unit of 
account. However, the converse is not necessarily true, i.e. a good can be used as a unit of 
account without being considered as a money, i.e. without fulfilling the two other functions of 
money (medium of exchange and store of value). Indeed, a unit of account is simply the unit 
by which the prices of all other items are quoted. Therefore, a pure and simple bartering 
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system may be associated with a simple price system (similar to the one associated with 
money) as long as a unit of account has been introduced. As a remark, even though the value 
of the exchanged goods is expressed with respect to a standard of value, it does not mean that 
the latter is also exchanged during the transaction. In other words, barter can also be realized 
when an object of an agreeable value is used as a measuring device of the exchanged goods. 
This object can be anything acceptable to the parties of the transaction; then the buyer and the 
seller reckon the present value of their goods against a third commodity of common use. 
The second case, which is less demanding when compared to the first one, is to introduce 
some "set rates" or "customary rates" (Chapman, 1980). This means that some relatives prices 
– for instance those concerning the goods which are most frequently exchanged – are set or 
decided arbitrarily. This case is worthwhile since it highlights the fact that the presumed 
complexity of the relative price system depends on the scale at which the economy is 
analyzed, namely either at the micro or at the macro level. Let us consider both levels. 
At the micro or individual level, we may assume, especially since we consider ancient 
economies, that the total number of goods present in the economy was quite limited. We may 
also assume that, given his preferences and income (both depending on the social class he 
belongs to), a representative agent of such ancient economy could afford only a limited 
number of different goods. In other words, it is likely that an agent was used to exchange a 
limited number of goods, and moreover that these exchanges were repeated several times per 
year, month or even days, depending on the goods considered. Therefore, this agent was very 
aware of the relative prices of the goods he was intended to buy or to sell; then, the 
computation of all the relative prices was completely useless from his point of view since only 
a limited set of prices was relevant for him. 
On the contrary, at the macro level, computing all the relative prices could be important and 
even necessary. However, one may wonder what does it mean to talk about the "macro level" 
in ancient economies? For sure it can make sense only from the development of city-states 
and empires, such as the ones which have emerged in Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt. For 
the others social organization, such as the band, the tribe or the chiefdom, according to 
Service's (1966) classification of the stages of social evolution, it is of no value to know all 
the relative prices of the goods present in the economy since most exchanges were based on 
either sharing/reciprocity or redistribution. Nevertheless, such knowledge was crucial in the 
early states which have appeared later, at the turn of the Neolithic and the metal age periods 
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(namely during the Chalcolithic period). Indeed, Sumerian city-states as well as Pharaonic 
Egypt were based on palatial economies, as were later Minoan and Mycenaean economies 
(Svizzero and Tisdell, 2015). In these palatial economies it was crucial for the administration 
to know all the relative prices in order to compute, to record and to enforce the payment of 
various social obligations (e.g. taxes, levies, corvée labor, slavery...) and to measure their 
wealth. Hence, it is very likely that it was in these early states that a unit of account had been 
introduced in order to solve the problem encountered by the barter system. Indeed, while 
agriculture was present in the Near East from around 10,000 B.C.E., the emergence of these 
early states coincides with the extensive development of irrigated agriculture, during the third 
millennium BC. The latter has led to the hydraulic civilization (Wittfogel, 1957), 
characterized by an increase of the agricultural production, an expansion of the population, 
the development of non-agricultural activities associated with the "urban revolution" (Childe, 
1950). In other words, the implementation of extensive irrigated agriculture triggered an 
increase of the number of goods as well as of the number of persons in the economy. This 
would have led to a growing complexity if a unit of account had not been introduced. 
7.  The Double Coincidence of Wants and the Credit System 
The second presumed drawback of barter is, for an exchange to occur, there is the necessity to 
have the double coincidence of wants, a term used by Jevons (1875). In fact, in-kind 
transactions require three conditions to occur: 
a) both parties must agree about the relative price or the terms of exchange, 
b) each party is motivated for buying the good supplied by the other party, 
c) the goods involved in the exchange are available immediately.  
Let us consider what happens when any of these three conditions is not fulfilled.  
If, unlike condition a), an agreement is not reached, even after both parties have bargained for 
a while, one may expect that the competitive pressures provided by the other members of the 
economy could finally lead both parties to agree. However, such an outcome is not certain. 
What is more important is that whatever the economy, with or without money, the previous 
conclusion remains the same. 
When condition b) is not verified, it means for instance that one party is not attracted by the 
good sold by the other party, whatever its price. In other words, there is no coincidence of 
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wants. Agent A wants to buy the good sold by agent B, but B is not attracted by the good sold 
by A. Despite this lack of coincidence of wants, there are two situations in which agent A 
could nevertheless buy the good sold by B. The first, as suggested by the metallists, is to 
introduce a medium of exchange –which is socially accepted, for example money. In this 
case, A obtains the good sold by B, and B gets some money with which he/she will be able to 
buy the good he wants from another agent. The second situation occurs when the intermediate 
is not a commodity but a third person (a middleman), agent C. Then, what may happen is the 
following sequence of exchanges: C first exchanges with B, and then he exchanges with A. At 
the end of the process, A and B are satisfied (and C as well), but this process requires the 
coincidence of wants between B and C as well as between C and A. The question is then 
which situation is the more likely to occur, the first one based on money, or the second one, 
which includes a third person? Both situations may lead to an exchange, but it is impossible to 
say a priori which is the easiest one to implement. Indeed, the first situation requires money, 
but money has first to be socially accepted, and this is not straightforward to achieve. In the 
second situation, the exchanges require two coincidence of wants, and here also this adds 
some costs. 
When condition c) is not verified, it means that there is no immediate coincidence of wants. 
The problem here is about the timing, i.e. the goods can only be delivered at different dates. 
For instance cherries and grapes ripen respectively in May and September, so they cannot be 
physically exchanged at the same date. However, both parties may agree to exchange since 
the delayed coincidence of wants is reached. What is needed is an agreement explaining that 
cherries are delivered in May for grapes which will be delivered in September. Such 
agreement implicitly means that a debt and credit system is introduced between both agents. 
This system implies that the lender gets sufficient information about the borrower in order to 
be sure to be repaid on the due date. It also necessitates the definition of some compensation 
for the lender if, for any reason, the borrower cannot repay in due time.  
The previous demonstration leads us to the following conclusion.  
If there is no coincidence of wants – immediate as well as delayed – then the exchange 
requires the introduction of an "intermediate". The latter can be either money or a third 
person. However it is a priori impossible to determine which of these two cases – the 
monetary transaction or the in-kind transaction – is the easiest to implement in society. In 
other words, barter is not necessarily more difficult to achieve than monetary transactions. 
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If the coincidence of wants is not immediate but is delayed, then the exchange may 
nevertheless occur if an appropriate system of debt and credit is introduced.  
Therefore, it seems that the importance of the transaction costs implied by the double 
coincidence of wants associated with barter has been largely exaggerated in the academic 
literature. Indeed, most economic activities are based on temporal processes. Production is not 
a one-shot event but a process which takes time, i.e. one has first to incur the costs associated 
with the investments in order to be able to reap the benefits provided by the production later.  
8.  Irrigated Agriculture and Complex Societies of Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt 
The general history of Mesopotamian (especially from the Early Dynastic period (2990-2300) 
to Ur third dynasty (2047-1940)) economic and social development accords nicely with that 
of ancient Egypt (the Old kingdom, 2700-2200). 
The first reason in support of this comes from the fact that both civilizations, which have 
emerged during the IV to the III millennia B.C.E., were located in the Near East and therefore 
experienced quite the same bio-geographic conditions. The latter encompass the climate, the 
quality of the soil, the access to fresh water, animal species suitable for domestication and 
plant species suitable for cultivation. As is well known, agriculture first occurred in the Near 
East about 10,000 BCE. The transition from foraging to farming societies was probably very 
slow and gradual - despite the label of "Neolithic revolution" - because farming was a trial 
and error process during its early ages. Mixed economies, combining food procurement and 
food production would have been the rule for a while (Smith, 2001). In this context, and 
despite the emergence of agriculture, the social structure remained almost unchanged during 
most of the Neolithic period, i.e. quite similar to the one which prevailed during the pre-
Neolithic period. Band of foragers were egalitarian, i.e. their social structure was not 
hierarchical. With the development of agriculture, such social relationships gradually 
vanished; sharing and the rule of hospitality mostly disappeared and social obligations 
between social groups or classes became the rule. This pattern of social evolution is well 
documented in the academic literature and has been labeled the transition from simple to 
complex societies (Tainter, 1988). In ancient Egypt for instance, this transition happened in 
the period 4400-3000 BCE (Henry, 2004, p. 80). 
The second common factor of Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations was that the level of 
agricultural production was tremendously enhanced by the building of large irrigation systems 
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(Wittfogel, 1957), thanks to the existence of large rivers (Nile, Euphrates, Tigris). According 
to Malthus's law, a greater amount of agricultural production results in a higher level of 
population. However, such a catalytic relationship between agriculture and demography 
increased the dependency of the human population on food production. Since the bulk of the 
population became dependent on irrigated agriculture for its survival, it has also become 
dependent on a small group of people - let us call these "the elite" - who were able to 
conceive, to build and to maintain the irrigation systems (consisting mainly of canals, dykes 
and water tanks). Of course, this elite rapidly took advantage of the situation to impose 
several social obligations on the commoners (e.g. taxes, levies, corvée labor, slavery...) 
(Tisdell and Svizzero, 2017). This led to the emergence of palatial economies, i.e. to 
economies which were dominated by temples and palaces. 
Even though they have most features in common, the palatial economies of Mesopotamia and 
ancient Egypt also had differences. In Egypt, the Pharaoh had total control of the society; his 
power was economic, political and religious (Henry, 2004). He, and his administration, were 
therefore able to collect social obligations from any Egyptian village. Such control was quite 
easy to monitor since most (if not all) villages were dependent on the Nile‟s flows. As 
illustrated by the Sumerian city-states, the Mesopotamian economy was dual (Hudson, 2004). 
On the one hand there was the rural-family economy present in hamlets and small villages. 
These centers were mostly independent entities. On the other hand, there was the palatial 
economy comprised of temples and palaces owning land, seed corn, flocks, tools and various 
other commodities that were all rented to a significant part of the population. The 
Mesopotamian temple was the dominant social institution (Seaford, 2004). It organized the 
collection and redistribution of the agricultural surplus. The production was also 
administrated from the center the bureaucrats at the temples. 
9.  Barter, Credit and Unit of Account in Mesopotamian and Ancient Egyptian 
Palatial Economies. 
Even though the Sumerian and the Egyptian palatial economies had different structures, they 
had a common thread. Unlike current governments which are debtors with respect to their 
population, they were creditors. Indeed they provided the population with advances, such as 
grain to farmers, or commodities to traders. These advances created social obligations or 
debts, i.e. commoners owed something to the temple. These debts were paid at some precise 
periods, such as, for farmers, during the harvest time, and for traders, once they came back 
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from their trip. In fact, most economic activities, such as crop cultivation, animal husbandry, 
and trade are temporal processes, i.e. they take time to be achieved. They necessitate 
important initial investments and a delay before production can be achieved. Therefore, with 
such features, the immediate coincidence of wants s not verified and barter seems to be 
impossible. Indeed, if for instance a farmer wants to sow grain in his fields, but has nothing to 
barter against the seed corn he wants, he cannot start any agricultural activity. Even though 
the immediate coincidence of wants is not verified, the delayed coincidence of wants can 
hold. Then, by introducing a system of debt and credit, exchanges of goods were possible in 
palatial economies even though no medium of exchange was introduced because they were 
relying on a system of delayed exchange. It is important to note that a condition for these 
delayed exchanges to occur is that an agreement between the parties is reached in advance to 
exchange commodities. 
The introduction of writing 
It is commonly agreed that the concept of writing was conceived and developed in ancient 
Sumer between 3400 and 3300 B.C.E.. Similarly, writing systems also arose in ancient Egypt 
around 3100 B.C.E.. Mesopotamian cuneiforms as well as Egyptian hieroglyphs were both 
introduced in order to keep account related to crops and farm animals. By the mid third 
millennium B.C.E., the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt were recording in 
writing details of payments. These writings - inscribed in cuneiform on clay tablets in 
Mesopotamia - list the charges made to inhabitants for the lease of temple land for agricultural 
use. The details of such lease agreement are provided for instance by clay tablets associated to 
the reign of Urukagina, king of Lagash (2400 B.C.E.). The lease gave the tenant farmer of one 
particular plot of land the use of it to grow barley and to graze his goats on condition that he 
made the following three separate payments to the temple treasury (Cribb, 2004): 
- a number of basketfuls of barley, representing a proportion of the grain harvested 
from the land, to be paid as rent, 
- a weighted amount of silver to pay for his right to graze goats on the land, 
- a specified number of goats paid to cover the costs the temple has incurred in 
irrigating the land. 
The details of the previous agreement provide two insights. On the one hand, because this 
agreement was between the temple and a mere farmer, it demonstrates that a system of debt 
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and credit was ubiquitous in ancient economies, i.e. was not restricted to high-value 
transactions or international trade. On the other hand, since the payments had to be made in 
barley, silver and goats, i.e. in various commodities, it shows that the system of debt and 
credit was associated with bartered transactions rather than with monetary payments. 
The standardization of weights and measures 
The main problem for the administration and the elite with this system of social obligations 
based on debt and credit was to define its precise accounting. Indeed, it was important to 
define these obligations, to record them and to enforce their payment in due time. It is widely 
agreed by scholars that it was for solving such accounting problems that writing was 
developed. Besides writing, the administration has also had to define various standards of 
measure related to weight, length, capacity and also to value. Concerning the latter, the 
administration of palatial economies introduced a unit of account. It is important to note that 
such unit of account was a "good" only used for this purpose, i.e. was not used as a medium 
of exchange. By doing so these administrations have resolved the problem of the complexity 
of the relative price system associated with barter. 
In Pharaonic Egypt, this unit of account was called the Deben and was in fact a measure of 
weight equal to 91 grams (Henry, 2004). Initially, it was a weight measure of barley, then of 
metal (copper) and finally of silver. These changes of the goods used to define the Deben 
show that it was not these goods per se that were important, but the fact that it was a unit of 
account of all the goods of the economy. In fact, the Deben had no actual existence, as, for 
example does a dollar today. In Sumerian city-states, the unit of account was called the 
Shekel. It was also a unit of weight which initially was defined as the weight of 180 grains of 
barley (which corresponds to a handful of barley grains) (Hudson, 2004). Once again, 
Urukagina, king of Lagash (2400 B.C.E.), fixed the official weight standards by which all 
commodities were to be measured in all payments (Cribb, 2004): 
- the talent (about 30 kg) which was divided into 60 mina, 
- the mina (about half kg) which was divided into 60 shekels, 
- the shekel (about 8.3 grams) was divided into 180 grains, 
- the grain (about 0.045 grams) represented the average weight of a grain of barley. 
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It is worth noting that the previous system of units of account was a system based on the 
measure of weight (and volume) and was not based on any specific commodity which could 
be interpreted as money. Indeed, by considering various commodities such as, for instance 
barley and silver, it was possible with this system of units of account to define the value of 
any object present in the economy. One may easily imagine that for luxury goods, their values 
were defined with respect to silver (or other scarce goods) while for everyday goods, such as 
staples, their values were most likely defined with respect to barley. 
In both Mesopotamia and Egypt, their administrations introduced these units of account in 
order to define arbitrarily the relative prices of all the commodities. Indeed, in these palatial 
economies market exchange was marginal since most prices were regulated. For instance, the 
silver Shekel was equal in value to the monthly consumption unit of barley (which was called 
a bushel). In Mesopotamia also, from 2400 to 2000 B.C.E., there is much evidence of 
payments of many kinds based on laws issued from legal codes drawn up on clay tablets 
(Cribb, 2004). For instance, king Ur-Nammu (2047-2030 B.C.E.), founder of the third 
dynasty of Ur in southern Mesopotamia, is chiefly remembered today for his legal code, the 
oldest known surviving example in the world. This code, from which 20 laws have been 
retrieved on clay tablets, set the amounts due in certain payments, as compensation. His law 
25 is the following: 
If a man appeared as a witness in a lawsuit and was shown to be perjured he must 
pay 15 shekels of silver. 
Similarly, the law 1 of the Eshnunnan legal code - written at the end of the third millennium 
by a king of the northern city of Eshnunna - lists the official prices (exchange rate) of 1 shekel 
of silver for several other commodities. For instance, it has to be exchanged for: 
1 kor (an ancient unit of capacity) of barley, 
6 mina of wool, 
2 kor of salt, 
3 mina of copper. 
In its law 2, this Eshnunnan code defines similar relative prices in terms of barley. Law 7 
defines the payment of wages, either in silver or in barley. 
All these legal codes provide evidence that prices were administrated in ancient economies 
and that even though these prices were often defined with respect to some commodities, 
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especially silver and barley, it does not imply that these were used during the exchanges 
(Powell, 1996). These legal codes also confirm that the debt and credit system was ubiquitous 
and therefore that most - if not all - transactions were in fact delayed exchange. Indeed, these 
codes also describes loan with interest. Law 21 of the Eshnunnan code states that: 
If a man gives silver as a loan at face value, he shall receive the silver and its 
interest, one sixth of shekel and six grains per shekel. 
Similarly, law 20 describes the payment of barley for the return of a loan and its interest. 
The existence of loans with interest demonstrates that the credit system was ubiquitous in 
ancient economies. Money played no part since these loans and their repayments were defined 
in terms of commodities. For example, repayments were in terms of items such as silver and 
barley. 
10.  Conclusion 
According to the metallists, the origin of money in the economy comes from the lower 
efficiency of barter. It is because transaction costs associated with barter hindered exchanges 
that agents adopted a medium of exchange. This view expressed in the late 19th century 
which is supported by orthodox or neo-classical economists, became dominant among 
economists as well as in other social sciences. However, this view is subject to two main 
criticisms. First, the metallist perspective projects the notion of a preeminence of markets and 
trade into ancient economies. On the one hand, unlike substantivists, we do not believe that 
individuals are disembedded, even though we agree that they were modern market economies 
and embedded ancient economies. We contend that individuals are still embedded in the 
current socio-economic system, possibly more so than in the distant past (Tisdell, 2017), but 
the current socio-economic system radically differs from the ancient one. Institutions, habits 
of thought, transactional modes, and forms of socio-economic integration which characterized 
past societies are not found in modern societies. With these modern institutions transplanted 
into ancient societies, the origins of money follow logically rather than based upon 
historically situated and institutional grounded inquiry. On the other hand, it is a fallacy to 
project today‟s notions of trade and commerce in analyzing ancient societies without a good 
deal of qualification. These activities were both quite marginal compared to the importance 
they have nowadays. 
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Second, the metallists specify money's origins and nature in terms of purely logical 
reconstructions. The adoption of money - as a medium of exchange - is conceived by 
metallists as the outcome of a rational process, i.e. as a result of foresight or forethought by 
individuals. Rather than such rational choice theories of the adoption of money, we opt for a 
more evolutionary and adaptive approach based on the process of social selection. The use of 
money and its spread are not explained as the consequences of intended decisions taken by 
rational agents but simply because it had evolutionary advantages which were revealed quite 
late, as shown by the late adoption of coinage in the Near East. Nevertheless, we posit that 
some elites hindered the introduction of monetary exchange because it was to their advantage 
e.g. it enabled them to retain more political power and more easily extract a larger portion of 
the economic surplus. 
Theseancient economies of Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt were palatial. There was very 
little market exchange. Barter, associated with a system of debt and credit, and including an 
arbitrary unit of account, was ubiquitous. Such economies, without any monetary transactions 
existed for millennia. Indeed, money as a medium of exchange was introduced in these 
economies long after the 3rdmillennium. For instance, while coinage was well known from its 
Lydian seventh century B.C.E. adoption, it was only introduced in Egypt during the Ptolemaic 
period (i.e. during the last three centuries B.C.E.). Similarly, it is only at the end of the 
Achaemenid period (about 330 B.C.E.) that the presence of coins is attested to 
archaeologically in Mesopotamia. Such apparent disinterest in coinage cannot be because 
Mesopotamia was an economic backwater, since by the third millennium B.C.E., at the latest, 
it was crisscrossed by trade routes connecting it with Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Indian 
subcontinent (Powell, 1996, pp. 225-226). What seems likely, it that the success of their 
system of payment - based on delayed barter and a system of units of account - postponed the 
adoption of primitive monies and ultimately the introduction of coinage. It is also likely that 
in these ancient societies, the elite (temple and palace) hampered or hindered the introduction 
of coinage because with its centralized system of debt and credit, their control over the whole 
economy was total and so the surplus extraction was easier. Other more recent historical 
examples strengthen this view. For instance Szabo (2002) quoted the following : 
"From the very start, England's 17th century colonies in America had a problem – 
a shortage of coins The British idea was to grow large amounts of tobacco, cut 
timber for the ships of their global navy and merchant marine, and so forth, 
sending in return the supplies they felt were needed to keep the Americans 
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working. In effect, early colonists were supposed to both work for the company 
and shop at the company store. The investors and the Crown much preferred this 
to paying in coin what the farmers might ask, letting the farmers themselves buy 
the supplies – and, heaven forbid, keep some of the profit as well." 
It is because money, whatever its form, is the most liquid asset, and therefore its uses are very 
difficult to monitor, that elites have favored in-kind transactions, as is illustrated by the 17th 
century mercantilist policy which England imposed on its American colonies. 
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